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Abstract
Why do some authoritarian governments respond beneficently to political protest 
while others opt for repression? This article argues that beneficent government re-
sponses in the form of concessions or institutional inclusion are fostered by three 
interrelated mechanisms working at three distinct levels: institutionalization of po-
litical protest within the polity, external certification of protest demands by legally 
legitimized authorities, and interest polarization between protesting groups and the 
government. Empirical comparison of government responses to youth protests before 
and during the 2011 uprisings in Morocco and Egypt proves that the divergent strate-
gies in the two countries were not the result of spontaneous decision-making in times 
of heightened regime contention. Rather, they mirror established patterns of protest 
politics that are relatively resistant to ad-hoc manipulations. By extending the focus 
beyond a particular episode of contention, this study offers important insights into 
government-challenger relations in authoritarian regimes.
Keywords
Middle East – contentious politics – repression – concessions – authoritarian 
regimes – youth protest
Today, scholars of the Middle East widely agree that the Arab uprisings were 
sparked by youth movements that had long been mobilizing for political 
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change.1 Survey evidence shows that one third of young Arabs participated 
in protests prior to the uprisings.2 At the same time, governments responded 
differently to the initial mobilizations, despite striking similarities in terms of 
activist profiles and political demands. In monarchies such as Morocco and 
Jordan, incumbent rulers swiftly offered concessions or even inclusion in the 
regime.3 In dominant-party regimes, such as Tunisia and Egypt, protests were 
violently suppressed. Yet, the causal mechanisms underlying these varying 
government strategies remain underspecified: what makes some authoritarian 
governments more likely to respond beneficently to political protest?
Contrary to conventional wisdom, this article argues that authoritarian 
government’s strategies of dealing with dissent are not the result of some 
“autocratic intelligent design”4 reflecting the immediate interests of the in-
cumbent ruler. Instead, they are determined by established patterns of do-
mestic politics, including institutionalized interactions, existing linkages, and 
expectations between the actors involved. Drawing on relational approaches 
1 See, for example, Mohammed Al-Momami, “The Arab ‘Youth Quake’: Implications on De-
mocratization and Stability,” Middle East Law and Governance 3/1–2 (2011): 159–70; Dina She-
hata, “Youth movements and the 25 January revolution” in Arab Spring in Egypt, ed. Baghat 
Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 105–24; Rabab 
El-Mahdi, “Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures,” in Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of 
Arab Activism, ed. Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2014), 52–75; Marc Lynch, “Introduction” in The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious 
Politics in the Middle East, ed. Marc Lynch (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 7.
2 Michael Hoffmann and Amaney Jamal, “The Youth and the Arab Spring: Cohort Differences 
and Similarities,” Middle East Law and Governance 4/1 (2012): 176. This finding is in line with 
earlier studies that have found young people to be more prone to protest behavior than any 
other age cohort. See, for example, Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and 
Political Violence,” International Studies Quarterly 50/3 (2006): 607–29; Ragnhild Nordås and 
Christian Davenport “Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression,” American Journal 
of Political Science, 57/4 (2013): 926–40. These results are particularly relevant in light of the 
fact that a majority of the region’s population is under the age of thirty.
3 Hereafter, the term government will be used to describe “the group who controls the state.” 
Patrick van Inwegen, Understanding Revolution (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 7. By contrast, 
regime defines “the formal and informal organization of the center of political power, and of 
its relations with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, 
and how those who are in power deal with those who are not.” Robert M. Fishman, “Rethink-
ing State and Regime: Southern Europe’s Transition to Democracy,” World Politics 42/3 (1990): 
428.
4 Nathan J. Brown, “Advice for Youngsters: Do as I say, not as I did,” in Reflections on the Arab 
Uprisings, pomeps Studies, 10 (2014), 9.
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from contentious politics, I propose that government responses are shaped 
by three interrelated mechanisms, which operate on three distinct levels: 
First, institutionalization of political protest in the polity defines the extent to 
which protests follow established procedures. Institutionalization renders out-
comes more predictable, thereby lowering levels of conflict and increasing the 
chances of beneficent responses. Second, external certification of the protest 
refers to recognized authorities’ validation of the actors and their demands. 
By providing protesters with legitimacy, certification also renders beneficent 
responses more likely. Third, interest polarization between the claimants 
describes the extent to which opinions diverge with regards to the desired dis-
tribution of power. Where protesters aim at ousting or persecuting the govern-
ment, the possibilities for compromise and subsequent beneficent responses 
are diminished.
These three mechanisms will be illustrated by looking at government re-
sponses towards youth protest before and during the Arab uprisings. The fo-
cus on youth is justified by their particular capacity for disruption and their 
role as “first movers” in 2011.5 Across the region, youth movements triggered 
mass contention by initiating “informational cascades”6 about previously con-
cealed discontent in society. Moreover, youth protests offer a good opportunity 
to study divergent government responses to similar instances of contention, 
as they share important commonalities in terms of demands, activist profiles, 
and repertoires of action.7 Empirical analysis will focus on the diverse cases 
of Morocco and Egypt: the Moroccan government responded beneficently to 
a range of the protesters’ demands, while the Egyptian government opted for 
marginalization and repression. By comparing divergent cases, the study aims 
to develop theoretical arguments, which can be applied to spatially and tem-
porally different contexts.
The empirical analysis is based on a detailed reading of news coverage, sys-
tematic consultation of secondary sources, and original interview data. The 
latter comprises twenty-four semi-structured interviews with senior officials 
5 Adria Lawrence, “Repression and Activism among the Arab Spring’s First Movers: Evidence 
from Morocco’s February 20th Movement,” British Journal of Political Science 47/3 (2017): 
699–718.
6 Susanne Lohmann, “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations 
in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91,” World Politics 47/1 (1994): 319–33.
7 Nadine Abdalla, “Youth movements in the Egyptian Transformation: Strategies and Reper-
toires of Political Participation,” Mediterranean Politics 21/1 (2016): 44–63; Mohamed Madani, 
Driss Maghraoui and Saloua Zerhouni, The 2011 Moroccan Constitution: A Critical Analysis 
(Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2012).
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from state ministries and implementation agencies in 2013. This corresponds 
to the first government under Abdelilah Benkirane (Justice and Development 
Party) in Morocco and the interim government under Adly Mansour (Inde-
pendent) in Egypt, which was installed after the coup d’état on July 3, 2013. Ini-
tial interviews were conducted with officials responsible for the formulation 
and implementation of youth-related policy in the Ministries of Youth, Labor 
and Social Development and their corresponding agencies.8 In Morocco, this 
additionally included the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry for Relations with 
Parliament and Civil Society, and the Ministry of Higher Education. A second 
phase added interviews at ministries and agencies that emerged as crucial in 
the first round.9 Interviews were held in French in Morocco, and in Arabic 
and English in Egypt, and transcribed for further analysis. To protect respon-
dent confidentiality, interviewees were anonymized beyond their institutional 
affiliation.10
The remainder of the article will proceed as follows: The next section dis-
cusses existing research on government responses to political protest under 
authoritarianism. Then the causal mechanisms underlying beneficent re-
sponses will be specified. The following case studies present the opportunity 
to apply the theoretical framework to the empirical analysis of government 
responses to youth protests in Morocco and Egypt. Finally, the conclusion con-
siders broader theoretical and empirical implications.
 Beneficent Government Responses to Political Protest Under 
Authoritarianism
Scholars of authoritarianism generally agree that non-democratic regimes can-
not persist by relying on repression alone; they also require a modicum of so-
cietal support.11 Constant repression of political dissent is not only costly, but 
8 In Egypt, a number of interviewees held interim office as minister or vice-minister in the 
bureaucratic government following the 2013 coup d’état.
9 In Egypt, this included the Ministries of Finance and Planning, respectively. In Morocco, 
interviews were also conducted at the Sharifian Phosphate Office (ocp), the largest state 
company, and the Mohammed v Foundation.
10 All interview transcripts are on file with the author.
11 See, for example, Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After 
Twenty Years?”, 125; Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship, 76; Johannes 
Gerschewski, “The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in 
Autocratic Regimes,” Democratization 20/1 (2013): 21.
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can also increase mobilization in the long run.12 Therefore, to (re-) establish 
political support among actual or potential opposition groups, authoritar-
ian governments often respond beneficently to their demands.13 Beneficent 
responses consist of either concrete economic or political concessions that 
 cater to the challengers’ demands, or their inclusion in the political process.14 
While related, these two types of response are distinct in their logic: conces-
sions, which range from spending on public or private consumption goods to 
the extension of political rights, grant concrete benefits in exchange for demo-
bilization. On the other hand, inclusion has legitimizing benefits by offering 
activists or entire social movement organizations – that is organizations taking 
a coordinating role in the opposition movement – the possibility to henceforth 
pursue their interests within the legal political sphere. By setting incentives for 
protesting groups to demobilize, beneficent responses help to fragment op-
position to the regime.15
Yet, the question remains: when do authoritarian governments respond be-
neficently to political protest rather than resorting to repression.16 The com-
parative literature on authoritarianism suggests that domestic politics are 
strongly influenced by the subtype of authoritarian rule in a given country. 
Monarchies are less likely than republics to experience political instability, and 
12 Christian Davenport, Carol Mueller, Hank Johnston, eds., Repression and Mobilization 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
13 Courtenay R. Conrad, “Constrained Concessions: Beneficent Dictatorial Responses to the 
Domestic Political Opposition,” International Studies Quarterly 55 (2011): 1167–87.
14 Ibid. 1169–70; Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Oppo-
nents, and Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 75.
15 Other authors have analyzed beneficent government responses in terms of different 
forms of co-optation, i.e., material and institutional-structural co-optation. For a discus-
sion of this literature see Maria Josua, “Co-optation Reconsidered: Authoritarian Regime 
Legitimation Strategies in the Jordanian ‘Arab Spring,’” Middle East Law and Governance 
8/1 (2016): 32–56.
16 Following Tarrow, political protest refers to “disruptive collective action that is aimed at 
institutions, elites, authorities, or other groups on behalf of the collective goals of the 
actors or of those they claim to represent”. Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform: 
Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991), 11. In the context of authoritarian regimes, Bratton and de Walle have narrowed the 
definition to collective action in which “protesters make explicit demands for changes 
in political rights or rulership”. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic 
Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997), 129.
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therefore make less use of repression.17 In a study comparing monarchies and 
dominant-party regimes, Lust-Okar and Jamal found important differences 
in the institutional management of opposition: liberalized monarchies tend 
to create institutions that balance political power among competing forces, 
whereas dominant-party regimes generate institutions that concentrate po-
litical power.18 This is because monarchies and dominant-party regimes differ 
fundamentally with regards to their bases of political power. Monarchs derive 
legitimacy from non-electoral sources and can therefore serve as political arbi-
ters atop competing political forces.19 By contrast, the legitimacy of presidents 
is intertwined with popular politics; this involves a strong political party to 
penetrate society.20 Therefore, governments in dominant-party regimes can-
not tolerate other strong political organization. This finding indicates that 
monarchs and presidents have different options when dealing with opposition 
movements.
Other scholars have proposed that divergent government responses to po-
litical protest are shaped by different elite constellations. Mass contention not 
only creates public disorder, it also provides opportunities for organized op-
position to draw in new adherents and hereby strengthen their political lever-
age. In such moments, elite cohesion is crucial for regime survival. Where elite 
actors have divergent preferences and assessments regarding the use of coer-
cion and reaching agreement with the opposition, divisions between “hardlin-
ers” and “softliners” can emerge. These divisions can lead to elite splits and 
ultimately result in regime collapse.21 Therefore, governments sometimes alter 
their strategies as protests evolve. For example, this shift was visible during the 
17 See, for example, André Bank, Thomas Richter, and Anna Sunik, “Durable, Yet Different: 
Monarchies in the Arab Spring,” Journal of Arabian Studies 4/2 (2014): 163–79; B. Todd 
Spinks, Emile Sahliyeh, and Brian Calfano, “The Status of Democracy and Human Rights 
in the Middle East: Does Regime Type Make a Difference?”, Democratization 15/2 (2008): 
321–41.
18 Ellen Lust-Okar and Amaney Ahmad Jamal, “Rulers and Rules. Reassessing the Influence 
of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation,” Comparative Political Studies 35/3 (2002): 
337–66.
19 Lisa Anderson, “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East,” Political 
Science Quarterly 106 (1991): 1–15.
20 Ellen Lust-Okar and Amaney Ahmad Jamal, “Rulers and Rules,” 354–55; Beatriz Magaloni 
and Ruth Kricheli, “Political Order and One-Party Rule,” Annual Review of Political Science 
13 (2010): 123–43.
21 Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillip Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democ-
racies, in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Phillip Schmitter 
and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 15–17; Adam 
Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 51–94.
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2011 protests in Bahrain, where the softliner Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad 
Al Khalifa invited protesting groups to a national dialogue following a period 
of intense state violence. When the dialogue failed to produce results, the gov-
ernment returned to its repressive hardline approach. Other studies focusing 
on the events of 2011 insist on the importance of government-military rela-
tions for the outcome of the protests, i.e., whether the military agrees to fire 
upon protesters or not.22 However, all of these studies focus on elite behavior 
after the first government strategies failed and protests escalated. Because elite 
splits and military defection are not visible in the early stages of protest, they 
cannot explain initial government responses.
Finally, the literature on repression insists on the perceived threat to explain 
when governments resort to physical coercion. The link between levels of pro-
test and repression is well established.23 Moreover, research suggests that the 
type of protest demands shapes the government’s threat perception.24 Political 
protests targeting existing power structures pose a direct threat to the regime’s 
legitimacy, and are therefore repressed.25 Protest activities focused on narrow 
demands, such as labor issues or specific policies, are less threatening and 
can potentially even serve regime maintenance by informing governments of 
citizen preferences.26 Yet, related studies have difficulties explaining why gov-
ernments’ use of repressive strategies varies in light of similar threats. Indeed, 
a recent study focusing on repression during the 2011 uprisings in Egypt and 
Bahrain concluded that divergent strategies were less due to the actual threat – 
here operationalized as demands for political change and the level of mobili-
zation – than the overall inclusiveness of the regime and the size of its base.27
22 Bellin, Eva, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Les-
sons from the Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44/2 (2012): 127–49.
23 Jennifer Earl, Sarah A. Soule and John D. McCarthy, “Protest under fire? Explaining the po-
licing of protest,” American Sociological Review 68/4 (2003): 581–606; Christian Davenport, 
“State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 1–23; 
Sabine C. Carey, Protest, Repression and Political Regimes: An Empirical Analysis of Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa (New York: Routledge, 2009).
24 James C. Franklin, “Contentious Challenges and Government Responses in Latin Ameri-
ca,” Political Research Quarterly 62/4 (2009): 700–714.
25 Paul Y. Chang and Alex S. Vitale, “Repressive Coverage in an Authoritarian Context: 
Threat, Weakness, and Legitimacy in South Korea’s Democracy Movement,” Mobilization 
18/1 (2013): 19–39.
26 Peter L. Lorentzen, “Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian 
Regime”, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8 (2013): 127–58.
27 Maria Josua and Mirjam Edel, “To Repress or not to Repress – Regime Survival Strategies 
in the Arab Spring,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27/2 (2015): 289–309.
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In sum, the existing literature suggests that different regime structures, in-
cluding the institutional setup and actor constellations, account for divergent 
government responses to political protest. However, related claims tend to 
remain restricted to a general level. To get to the concrete mechanisms that 
determine beneficent – or repressive – government responses to political pro-
test, the next section draws on the comparative social movement literature.28  
Doing so, it inserts a twist on the common analysis of contentious politics, 
which tends to take the movement rather than the government perspective.
 Institutionalization, External Certification, and Interest 
Polarization
Scholars of contentious politics have long claimed that protest outcomes de-
pend on the government and opposition’s ability to compromise. Even if the 
government offers economic or political concessions to protesting groups, the 
success of its strategy will also depend on whether the latter accept or reject 
the offer. Drawing on the relational social movement literature, I propose that 
whether compromise is reached or not is shaped by three mechanisms on 
three distinct levels: institutionalization of political protest in the polity; exter-
nal certification of the protest demands by legally recognized authorities; and 
interest polarization between claimants.
First, structural-relational approaches to political contention have 
 demonstrated the impact of political institutionalization on political chal-
lengers’ actions and the strategies that governments are likely to pursue.29 
 Institutionalization of political protest captures the degree to which such pro-
tests have become part of the conventional repertoire which citizens use to 
express their opinions about the regime and its policies, and to which the gov-
ernment and its agencies have established strategies of dealing with them.30  
28 See for example Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspec-
tives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural 
Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
29 Sidney G. Tarrow and David S. Meyer, “A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for 
a New Century,” in The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Cen-
tury, ed. Sidney G. Tarrow and David S. Meyer (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 
1–28; see also Samuel P. Huntigton, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1968).
30 John D. McCarthy and Clark McPhail, “The Institutionalization of Protest in the United 
States,” in The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century, ed. Sid-
ney G. Tarrow and David S. Meyer (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 83–110.
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By rendering different claimants’ behavior more predictable, institutionaliza-
tion lowers levels of conflict. This “taming” of political protest goes hand in 
hand with increased chances of reaching political compromise, and thus be-
neficent government responses. Inversely, low institutionalization inserts un-
certainty into the process. In such contexts, governments will be more likely 
to suppress protests, and protesters will develop more confrontational claims 
and means of action. This can generate a vicious cycle: repression fuels dissent, 
which in turn, enflames repression.31 Thus, low institutionalization of political 
protest diminishes the chances for beneficent government responses.
Second, actor-centered approaches to contentious politics show that their 
outcomes also depend on third-party attitudes toward the protesters.32 Spe-
cifically, protests benefit from external certification, and thus “the validation 
of actors, their performances, and their claims by external authorities.”33 Cer-
tification can occur on varying levels of intensity, ranging from recognition 
and endorsement to active engagement.34 From the government’s perspec-
tive,  certification provides information about compliance that adds weight to 
 protesters’ demands, especially if it involves politically relevant elites. When le-
gally recognized actors – including political parties, interest groups, or  religious 
authorities – validate protesting groups as legitimate bargaining partners, this 
increases those groups’ political leverage.35 In times of low regime contention, 
the government can simply increase control and coercion of included elites 
to undermine such behavior. However, the uncertainty introduced by mass 
protests potentially opens opportunities for these elites to broaden their influ-
ence. Therefore, governments will be more likely to respond beneficently to 
political protest, when the latter signal their disposition to defect.36
Third, beneficent responses depend on the degree of interest polarization. 
Polarization refers to the “political and social space between claimants in a 
31 William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood: Dorsey, 1968).
32 Dingxin Zhao, “State-Society Relations and the Discourses and Activities of the 1989 Bei-
jing Student Movement,” American Journal of Political Science 44/1 (2000): 1595; Jennifer 
Earl, Sarah A. Soule and John D. McCarthy, “Protest under fire?”.
33 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 121.
34 Katie Furuyama and David S. Meyer, “Sources of certification and civil rights advocacy 
organizations: the jacl, the naacp, and crises of legitimacy,” Mobilization 16/1 (2011): 102.
35 Ibid.
36 On strategies of (re-)strengthening the regime base, see Maria Josua, “Co-optation Recon-
sidered,” 38–42. The argument can also be found in Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict 
in the Arab World, 89.
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contentious episode and the gravitation of previously uncommitted or mod-
erate actors toward one, the other, or both extremes.”37 In situations of high 
polarization, the moderate center is vacant and policy issues are filled with 
ideological content. In such situations, protest tends to be directed against the 
government, instead of at the government. No government will respond be-
neficently to protesters determined to topple it or even punish elites for past 
crimes. By contrast, low polarization facilitates moderation and compromise, 
and thus beneficent responses. Note that because protest movements are nev-
er homogenous, governments may seek to respond beneficently to moderate 
groups of protesters that are amenable to compromise, while repressing the 
rest.38
While the above specified mechanisms are conceptually distinct, their re-
sults are clearly interrelated: institutional arrangements shape incentives for 
external certification; institutionalization and certification together impact 
polarization. Inversely, polarization impedes certification from established 
authorities, thereby lowering the chances of institutionalization. Empirically, 
the workings of these mechanisms are difficult to disentangle. The next two 
empirical sections evaluate how institutionalization, certification and polar-
ization have affected protest dynamics and government responses in the diver-
gent cases of Morocco and Egypt.
 Comparing Government Strategies towards Youth Protest  
in Morocco and Egypt
The cases of Morocco and Egypt have served in previous comparisons of pro-
test politics in the region.39 In 2011, these two “early risers” were among the 
first monarchies or republics, respectively, to experience protest demanding 
37 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 45.
38 Hugo Gorringe and Michael Rosie, “It’s a Long Way to Auchterarder! ‘Negotiated Manage-
ment’ and Mismanagement in the Policing of G8 Protests,” The British Journal of Sociology 
59/2 (2008): 187–205.
39 Frédéric Vairel, “Protesting in Authoritarian Situations. Egypt and Morocco in Compara-
tive Perspective”, in Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle 
East and North Africa, ed. Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2011), 27–42; Florian Kohstall, “From Reform to Resistance: Universities and Student 
Mobilisation in Egypt and Morocco before and after the Arab Uprisings”, British Journal 
of Middle Eastern Studies 42/1 (2015): 59–73; Kressen Thyen and Johannes Gerschewski, 
“Legitimacy and protest under authoritarianism: explaining student mobilization in 
Egypt and Morocco during the Arab uprisings,” Democratization (2017).
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regime change.40 This study compares government responses to these initial 
demonstrations, which were still similar with regards to the type of activists 
and their demands. Indeed, the protests developed distinct dynamics as they 
unfolded. In Egypt, the core activists and their concrete demands became 
marginal in the subsequent mass mobilization.41 While the Egyptian protests 
became dominated by nationalist attitudes, the Moroccan protests remained 
driven by discontent with political institutions.42
The study follows a confirmatory, diverse case selection strategy. This ap-
proach selects two or more cases that span the continuum of either the depen-
dent or the independent value to maximize variance.43 The cases of Morocco 
and Egypt represent extreme values on the dependent variable: while Morocco 
responded beneficently to the initial youth protests in 2011, the Egyptian gov-
ernment opted for repression. The following analysis aims not only to illumi-
nate the empirical cases, but also to demonstrate the utility of the conceptual 
framework beyond these cases. Each case study commences with a short over-
view of the political context, before examining government responses to youth 
protest prior to and during the uprisings.
 Beneficent Government Responses to Youth Protests in  
Morocco: Institutionalization of Political Protest, External 
Certification, and Moderate Interest Polarization
In Morocco, political youth protest emerged in the context of a liberalized 
monarchy. Since the 1990s, Morocco’s so-called “processus démocratique” has 
become one of the main themes in political discourse.44 However, despite 
undeniable steps toward political pluralization, politics remain dominated by 
40 The case selection thus excludes cases that could have benefited from learning processes, 
which are limited by institutional and power settings at different levels. André Bank and 
Mirjam Edel, “Authoritarian Regime Learning: Comparative Insights from the Arab Upris-
ings,” giga Working Paper, 274 (2015).
41 Zachary C. Steinert-Threlkeld, “Spontanous Collective Action: Peripheral Mobilization 
during the Arab Spring,” American Political Science Review 111/2 (2017): 396–398.
42 Thyen and Gerschewski 2017, “Legitimacy and Protest,” 11.
43 Jason Seawright and John Gerring. “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research,” 
Political Research Quarterly 61/22 (2008): 294–308.
44 Abdeslam Maghraoui, “Depoliticization in Morocco,” Journal of Democracy 13/4 (2002): 
29; also see Kressen Thyen, “Promising Democracy, Legitimizing Autocracy? Perceptions 
of Regime Democraticness among University Students in Morocco”, Zeitschrift für Verglei-
chende Politikwissenschaft 11/2 (2017).
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the royal palace. The monarch controls the administration and the parliament 
through a network of royal counsellors, and all elected parliamentarians and 
higher state officials swear allegiance (bay’a) to him in a symbolic act of ser-
vitude.45 Consequently, the involvement of established political actors tends 
to follow the monarchy’s official or presumed position.46 This specific setup 
is not least related to the creation of a particularly effective “divided political 
environment,” in which the monarch remains ultimate arbiter in a fragmented 
political landscape.47 In this context, the government also expanded freedoms 
of expression, association and assembly. This created an institutional structure 
in which grassroots activism on political issues became possible as long as it 
did not touch upon the regime’s fundamental interests, namely the monarchy, 
religion, and the Western Sahara.48 Opposition groups have adapted to this 
political environment by pushing for specific reforms whilst avoiding the re-
gime’s “red lines.” Prominent examples are the women’s rights movement and 
the reform of the Moroccan family code (Mudawana), the Amazigh movement 
and the recognition of indigenous rights, or the human rights movement and 
the creation of a commission to determine compensation for victims of forced 
disappearances during the “years of lead” under the previous king. As a result, 
political protest today constitutes an established means of attaining material 
and political benefits even for the legally recognized opposition. While indi-
vidual cases of police violence are frequently reported, mass coercion has be-
come minimal.
The above patterns are mirrored in Morocco’s youth politics. On the formal 
side, the government has attempted to increase youth participation in existing 
participatory structures. In 2002, it reformed the minimum age for voting from 
20 to 18 years to “bring new blood into the practice of democracy.”49 In 2006, 
45 Mohamed Madani, Driss Maghraoui and Saloua Zerhouni, The 2011 Moroccan Constitution.
46 Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, “Democratization in the Arab World? Depoliticization in Mo-
rocco,” Journal of Democracy 13/4 (2002): 24–32.
47 Ellen Lust-Okar, “Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political 
Opposition,” Comparative Politics 36/2 (2004): 159–179.
48 Mohamed Tozy, “Représentation/Intercession. Les Enjeux de Pouvoir dans les ‘Champs 
Politiques Désamorcés’ au Maroc,” in Changements Politiques au Maghreb, ed. Michel 
Camau (Paris: Editions du crns, 1994), 153–168. Note that the government has employed 
repression where protests crossed these limits. For example, 800 people were arrested 
in December 2000 for participating in unauthorized demonstrations to mark the annu-
al Human Rights Day. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2002: Morocco,” https://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/morocco.
49 Mohammed vi, cited from Richard I. Lawless, “Morocco: History,” in The Middle East and 
North Africa, ed. Joanne Maher (London: Europa Publications, 2002), 832.
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the government created the Institute for Youth and Democracy (Institut de la 
Jeunesse et de la Démocratie), under the auspices of the Ministry for Youth and 
Sports to strengthen the youth wings of existing political parties. Moreover, di-
verse state organizations, foundations and international donor agencies have 
provided infrastructure and support to encourage youth activism in civil soci-
ety organizations. This fostered a relatively stable network of youth organiza-
tions, the larger of which enjoy national representation through a number of 
federations and national youth unions.
While youth protests emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s, Morocco had no 
encompassing youth protest movement before 2011. First protests occurred 
mainly within universities or in grassroots movements focused on develop-
ment and labor issues. The Movement of Unemployed Graduates (Mouve-
ment des diplômés chômeurs) is arguably one of the most influential of these 
movements. The movement emerged in reaction to the privatization of state 
 companies and slimming down of public administration in the context of 
structural reforms, demanding that the government tackle rising unemploy-
ment by reviving job creation in the public sector. Established opposition par-
ties and unions supported the initiative in its early years.50 In response to joint 
pressure from the protest movement and established opposition, King Hassan 
ii created the National Council for Youth and the Future (Conseil National de 
la Jeunesse et de l’Avenir, cnja), to assist in the development of youth employ-
ment policies.51 Habib El Malki, leader of the oppositional Socialist Union of 
Popular Forces (usfp), headed the council. When the government announced 
further structural reforms in 1995, the movement deployed more radical forms 
of contention, which varied from sit-ins to hunger strikes and squatting. 
 Following the arrest and sentencing of 26 protesters in El Jadida, opposition 
parties and established human rights organizations condemned the violent 
intervention by police forces. This added further impetus to the movement. In 
1997, Prime Minister Abdellatif Filali personally met with leading activists and 
promised to address their demands. The following years saw several recruit-
ment agreements between the government and the unemployed graduates, 
based on nominal lists established by the movement. Moreover, the Ministry 
of Employment and Vocational Training began to develop specialized training 
50 Montserrat Emperador Badimon, “Unemployed Moroccan University Graduates and 
Strategies for ‘Apolitical’ Mobilization,” in Social Movements, Mobilization and Con-
testation in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Joel Beinin, Frédéric Vairel (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011), 227.
51 Dahir n° 1-90-190 du 20/02/1991 portant création du Conseil de la jeunesse et de l’avenir 
(cnja) (bo n° 4088 du 06/03/1991).
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and job-creation programs, which are implemented to this day by the national 
employment agency (anapec). As confirmed in the interviews, the Ministry’s 
focus on unemployed graduates was directly related to their particular abil-
ity to exercise pressure on the government.52 Since then, the movement has 
moderated its demands to adopt an “apolitical” stance and was legally recog-
nized as the Association Nationale des Diplômés Chômeurs du Maroc (andcm) 
in 2003.
The government also responded favorably to youth involvement in socio-
economic protests. While legal opposition and civil society have been sus-
picious of mass mobilization in the past decades, they have still recognized 
the social agenda at the heart of these protests and gained political leverage 
from the mobilizations. In 2000, the Agency for Social Development (Agence 
du Développement Social, ads) was created, under the auspices of the Min-
istry for Social Development. The Agency’s long-standing director, Mohamed 
Najib Guedira, was a leading figure in the labor movement and counsellor of 
the 1998 “government of change.” To this day, the agency implements social 
development initiatives, including financial support for micro enterprises by 
youth and the promotion of social dialogue. In addition, influential founda-
tions have taken up the focus on youth, such as the Mohammed v Foundation 
for Solidarity, which was established by present King Mohammed vi in 1999. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that even incidents of political violence 
have been framed in social terms. For example, in response to the 2003 suicide 
bombing carried out by 14 young men from the shantytowns of Casablanca, 
the founder of the large development association Marocains Pluriels publicly 
stated in an interview that “we are all responsible” for the underlying youth 
marginalization.53 In the past fifteen years, projects aimed at preventing the 
marginalization and radicalization of young people have soared, especially 
with the launch of the National Initiative for Human Development (indh) in 
2005. However, these programs and initiatives remain geographically limited, 
targeting only specific communities within the country.
The emergence of the 2011 youth protests, led by the February 20 Move-
ment, has to be placed in this specific political context. The Movement con-
stituted a novelty insofar as it was the first to transcend the narrow demands 
of student or unemployed movements, and the first to explicitly address the 
52 Interviews by the author at the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training, 
anapec, and ads, Rabat, August/September 2013.
53 Bachir Hajjaj, “Nous sommes tous responsables,” Aujourd’hui Le Maroc, May 30, 2003, 
http://aujourdhui.ma/societe/nous-sommes-tous-responsables-29927.
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issue of democratic participation.54 Its overarching demand consisted in the 
establishment of a parliamentary monarchy, including a democratic consti-
tution, an elected government, separation of powers, the trial of individuals 
implicated in acts of corruption, recognition of the Amazigh heritage, and the 
liberation of all political prisoners. In addition, the movement called for the in-
tegration of unemployed graduates into the labor market, the introduction of a 
minimum wage and political measures against the high cost of living, and the 
extension of public services to the entire population.55 In doing so, the Move-
ment transgressed previous divisions between political camps, uniting youth 
activists from various political parties, community committees, human rights 
and Amazigh associations, trade unions, and the Islamist Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan 
movement.56 Moreover, members of other groups, such as the unemployed 
graduates and unaffiliated sympathizers, promptly joined its protests. The gov-
ernment has recognized the interconnectedness of the Movement’s political 
and social demands, as a senior official at the ads explained:
We are currently experiencing a growing consciousness among youth on 
the social and political level: they are interested in politics. Contrary to 
what is often said, they do not only want to work, but their demands on 
the socio-economic level reflect questions related to dignity and labor 
rights. […] [And] there is the political dimension, how we will integrate 
young people in political decision-making, where such channels are 
absent.57
Yet, the movement also connected to a previous protest tradition. In the words 
of another official, “we had protests well before, and there are protests that 
continue, these problems are not new.”58 The explicit link of the Movement’s 
agenda to previous political struggles provided it with some legitimacy from 
established opposition. Certainly, many of the established parties and civil 
54 Driss Maghraoui “Constitutional Reforms in Morocco: Between Consensus and Subaltern 
Politics,” The Journal of North African Studies 16/4 (2011): 688.
55 Thierry Desrues, “Moroccan Youth and the Forming of a New Generation: Social Change, 
Collective Action and Political Activism,” Mediterranean Politics 17/1 (2012): 32.
56 Mohamed Madani, Driss Maghraoui and Saloua Zerhouni, The 2011 Moroccan Constitu-
tion, 10–11.
57 Interview by the author at the ads, Rabat, September 2013 (author’s translation).
58 Interview by the author at the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training, Rabat, 
August 2013. This was also confirmed in an interview by the author at the Ministry of 
Interior, Rabat, September 2013.
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society organizations refrained from joining the protests.59 At the same time, 
many of the protesters also held membership in legally recognized organiza-
tions and political parties, thus creating individual ties.60 Reputable individu-
als from established civil society groups formed a 160-person National Council 
of Support of February 20 Movement, further recognizing and endorsing the 
movement. Lastly, journalists, bloggers, and activists created the online re-
source Mamfakinch (No Concessions) to cover the protests and have reached 
wide audiences in Morocco and beyond. This added to the movement’s cred-
ibility and public support.
Furthermore, the February 20 Movement conformed to a number of estab-
lished protest logics. Most importantly, it addressed its demands for regime 
change to the incumbent government instead of mobilizing to immediately 
overthrow the incumbent. Specifically, it demanded of the “royal institution to 
make the necessary changes to the political system, in a way that allows Moroc-
cans to rule themselves.”61 The movement’s call for a parliamentary monarchy 
reduced polarization of interests between the protesters and the government, 
as the latter was not to be completely deprived of political power. This offered 
opportunity for compromise, as a senior official explained:
The protests still remained in certain limits, […] there was only a minor-
ity that wanted to change the system [and abolish the monarchy]. But if 
the youth starts to really demand a change of the system that would be 
the knockout […]. The King is the guarantor of stability in Morocco, in 
contrast to other countries in the region.62
Within less than three weeks of the first protest, Mohammed vi gave a speech 
to the nation in which he acknowledged the need for a social charter and con-
stitutional reform, particularly addressing the “committed political parties and 
59 Emanuela Dalmasso, “Surfing the Democratic Tsunami in Morocco: Apolitical Society 
and the Reconfiguration of a Sustainable Authoritarian Regime,” Mediterranean Politics 
17/2 (2012): 228.
60 Nadine Sika, “Ambiguities of student activism, authoritarianism and democratic atti-
tudes: the cases of Egypt and Morocco,” The Journal of North African Studies 22/1 (2017): 
35–59.
61 Translation as cited in Anja Hoffmann and Christoph König, “Scratching the Democratic 
Façade: Framing Strategies of the 20 February Movement,” Mediterranean Politics 18/1 
(2013): 15.
62 Interview with a senior official in a private capacity by the author, Rabat, August 2013 
(author’s translation).
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trade unions, and […] Our ambitious youth.”63 The concessions’ announce-
ment initiated a process of gradual demobilization, as protesters waited for 
the government to follow up on its promises.
Subsequently, the government made a number of economic and political 
concessions. To start with, it created 3,400 new public administration posi-
tions, granted civil servants the highest salary increase in Moroccan history – 
up to 35 percent – and increased the minimum salary in the private sector.64 
It also increased the number of scholarships at public universities, which tra-
ditionally constitute an important base for protest mobilization. The Ministry 
of Employment and Vocational Training announced an extension of existing 
employment and training programs to youth without university diplomas.65 
The government also offered economic benefits to other youth groups that 
had started to mobilize during the unfolding protests. Following youth pro-
tests at the work sites of the Sharifian Phosphate Office (ocp), the state-run 
company responded with 5,000 ad-hoc recruitments. Additionally, it financed 
15,000 scholarships to provide vocational training for young people in the re-
gion.66 The government further published a new National Integrated Youth 
Strategy (snij), developed by the Ministry of Youth and Sports in conjunction 
with  other national authorities and the World Bank. The practical significance 
of this strategy remains hotly debated in official circles, as some consider it a 
mere “politique spectacle.”67
The government also made a number of political concessions, even if these 
remained far off from the kind of democratic reforms envisioned by the Move-
ment’s core activists. On April 14, 2011 the monarch granted pardon to scores 
of political prisoners, hereby answering to one of the movement’s principal 
demands. The revised constitution of July 29, 2011 includes a number of hu-
man rights that were formerly not recognized and grants Amazigh the status 
of an official language. Moreover, it specifies that the Prime Minister must be 
chosen from the party that won the elections, extends parliamentary powers, 
and recognizes the status of the opposition parties.68 While the February 20 
Movement continued to mobilize against the constitutional reform it deemed 
63 Mohammed vi, “Discours adressé par SM le Roi à la Nation,” March 9, 2011.
64 The minimum salary only benefits those employed in the formal economy, thus excluding 
the 88 percent of youth employed in the informal sector (cf. World Bank 2012).
65 Interview by the author at the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training, Rabat, 
August, 2013.
66 Interviews by the author at the ocp, Rabat and Casablanca, September 2013.
67 Interview by the author at the ads, Rabat, September 2013.
68 Mohamed Madani, Driss Maghraoui and Saloua Zerhouni, The 2011 Moroccan Constitu-
tion, 37.
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“undemocratic,” the government’s concessions had siphoned off segments of 
the movement’s supporters. Significantly, this resulted in decertification of the 
movement’s political demands by oppositional groups with more moderate 
preferences.
Finally, the government undertook a number of efforts to politically include 
organized youth that had mobilized in the protests. With an eye to youth in-
volvement in political parties, the government introduced a youth quota in 
the national parliamentary elections. Moreover, the activities of the National 
 Institute for Youth and Democracy were revived under a new director, Ismael 
El Hamraoui, who had been a youth member of the Forum des Alternatives 
Maroc – a prominent civil society organization that had endorsed the protest 
movement. In the context of constitutional reform, selected youth activists 
were called on to participate in the consultation process of the constitutional 
committee. As a result of this process, the 2012 constitution stipulates the cre-
ation of a Consultative Council of Youth and of Associative Action, which pro-
vides appointed members an institutional framework to express their policy 
preferences. Rather than constituting a democratic institution, the planned 
Council primarily caters to the particular interests of individual organizations 
and activists, strengthening their links to the government.
By selectively responding to the different demands voiced by the February 
20 Movement, the government has been able to minimize outright repression 
during protest events. Yet, this does not mean that repression has been absent; 
leading activists unwilling to moderate their demands have been repeatedly 
harassed by security forces.69 Following constitutional reform, this repression 
was paralleled by official discourse discrediting the Movement: questions of 
loyalty to the monarchy and the national reform project have emerged in a 
pronounced manner since 2012.70 At the same time, counter-movements as 
the March 9 Youth Movement and the Young Royalists begun to mobilize 
against the Movement. This has created a symbolic divide between activists 
that are “with” or “against” the official reform project. The February 20 Move-
ment has since been depicted as lacking a political agenda and pursuing goals 
detrimental to national cohesion while others – including youth involved in 
demonstrations over social and cultural issues – have been presented as “am-
bitious” or constituting a “new generation of Moroccans” concerned with the 
future of their country.
69 Emanuela Dalmasso, “Surfing the Democratic Tsunami in Morocco.”
70 Mohammed vi, “Discours de SM le Roi adressé à la nation à l’occasion du 39ème anniver-
saire de la Marche Verte,” November 6, 2014.
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 Repressive Government Responses to Youth Protests in Egypt: Low 
Institutionalization, Lack of Certification, and High Polarization
In Egypt, youth protests have developed in a different political context. While 
the country moved from a populist authoritarian regime under Nasser to a lib-
eralized neo-patrimonial regime under Mubarak, the army has remained the 
backbone of each regime. Prior to 2011, the recruitment of political personnel 
was based on their adherence to the National Democratic Party (ndp). This 
created a particular type of personal rule in a dominant-party system; strong 
alternative political organization posed an immediate challenge to the regime. 
To secure the regime’s party-personalist basis, the government relied on crude 
divide and rule strategies that concentrated power with the ruling party, and 
led to high polarization between the Islamist and liberal opposition.71 In this 
political environment, the government set strong incentives to contain protests 
strictly within the socio-economic realm, rewarding narrow and depoliticized 
demands with salary concessions or the maintenance of state subsidies. Un-
authorized political protest, on the other hand, was deterred through a severe 
association law and harsh intervention by security forces. This created two dis-
tinct types of protest: on the one hand, depoliticized protests and strikes that 
avoided crossing the line into openly political activity occurred in exchange 
for economic concessions. On the other hand, there were political protests 
transgressing the boundaries of the regime, which found little support among 
legally legitimized authorities and directly targeted the president.
These patterns of participation and protest were reflected in Egypt’s youth 
politics. In the effort to tie a greater number of youth to the regime, the gov-
ernment encouraged partisan and civil society participation in organizations 
loyal to the regime. In 2002, the ruling ndp established a youth committee 
and assigned young cadres to leading positions; other registered parties fol-
lowed its example.72 The National Council for Youth, which was the precursor 
to the current Ministry of State for Youth Affairs, offered training for youth 
active in political parties, government administration, and non-governmental 
organizations. In addition, the government encouraged youth engagement 
in developmental organizations with close ties to state ministries and youth 
clubs. However, total levels of youth engagement remained low.73
71 Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World.
72 Nadine Sika, “Youth Political Engagement in Egypt: From Abstention to Uprising,” British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 39/2 (2012): 181–99.
73 Ibid.
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With regards to protest politics, the institutionalized divide between so-
cio-economic and political protest also impacted youth mobilization. Young 
people were involved in labor strikes and protests against high unemployment 
and rising food prices. When protesters refrained from making political de-
mands, the government sporadically ceded to salary concessions and upheld 
subsidies. These concessions targeted the general population, as a government 
official explained:
The policies that have a generic nature, that cover the entire country, are 
the policies that do generate the greatest benefits to the youth and every-
body else […], the male and female, the poor and the middle class, and 
so on. […] Programs that target the youth are useful but limited by defini-
tion, while programs that do not target the youth but the entire popula-
tion, their policies have a very high pay off.74
Hence, there were only a few youth-specific initiatives in the fields of unem-
ployment and social exclusion, and these often benefited from international 
funding. For example, in 2007 the cabinet and undp jointly created the Social 
Contract Center (scc), which conducts specific training and job-creation pro-
grams for university students and marginalized youth in rural areas.75
The apolitical socio-economic protests and related government responses 
stand in stark contrast to the conflictual youth protests. The most prominent 
youth movement prior to the 2011 uprisings was the youth arm of the Kifaya 
(Enough) Movement, which had formed in 2004 in response to Mubarak’s 
attempt to nominate his son as the next presidential candidate. The self- 
proclaimed Youth for change mobilized against Mubarak, political corruption, 
and state violence. Their demands went “far beyond accepted limits of mobili-
zation by legal opposition parties.”76 Consequently, external authorities neither 
recognized nor endorsed the movement’s demands. Likewise, youth activists 
strongly denied any alleged links to established political parties or civil soci-
ety organizations, which they regarded as obsolete and corrupt. Interestingly 
74 Interview by Nadine Sika at the Ministry of Finance, Cairo, November 2013.
75 Note that the impact of these programs has been limited due to the poor commitment 
from local authorities, service providers and potential employers. Interview by the author 
at the scc, Cairo, December 2013.
76 Frédéric Vairel, “Protesting in Authoritarian Situations. Egypt and Morocco in Compara-
tive Perspective”, in Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East 
and North Africa, ed. Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2011), 38.
 111Managing Contention
middle east law and governance 10 (2017) 91-116
<UN>
enough, the movement’s confrontational stance did not immediately prompt 
substantial repression. Protests were largely ignored, as long as they remained 
small in size and geographically confined to the capital city.77 However, when 
youth activists began joining sectoral protests – such as the judges’ protests 
in 2006 – thereby inserting a political dimension, the government launched 
widespread repression. This strategy was initially successful, and Youth for 
Change disappeared for about two years. It reemerged under the name of the 
April 6 Movement in 2008, when youth activists decided to join massive labor 
strikes in El-Mahalla El-Kubra. Again, the government responded with repres-
sive measures that targeted youth activists and workers alike, not least to serve 
as a warning to workers to avoid further politicizing their protests. Since then, 
the government has controlled youth protests by sealing off entire areas of the 
city, police violence, imprisonment, or even torture. Repeated experiences of 
violence have increased radical sentiments among youth activists, creating an 
antagonistic relationship between the government and protesters.
The 2011 protests emerged against this particular background of polariza-
tion. By calling on Egyptians to take to the streets on January 25 – Police Day 
and national holiday – the April 6 Movement created a symbolic link to the 
“second revolution” that had begun on January 25, 1952 and led to the ouster 
of King Farouk several months later. On February 6, 2011, participating youth 
groups released a joint manifesto summarizing their demands: the immediate 
resignation of President Mubarak, dissolution of the parliament, establishment 
of a transitional government, a new constitution respecting the principles of 
freedom and social justice, prosecution of those responsible for police kill-
ings, and immediate release of detainees. The statement further specified that 
there would be no negotiations until Mubarak’s departure and that negotia-
tions would only be concerned with the transfer of political power.78 While the 
overarching aim of the protest – regime change – was the same as in Morocco, 
the youth protests in Egypt were thus explicitly directed against, rather than 
at the government.
As in the past, protesters refused any ties to included political elites, which 
they considered to be part of the problem. In contrast to Morocco, there were 
thus no moderating groups between the government and protesters. Stark 
77 On the strategy of ignoring see Dina Bishara, “The Politics of Ignoring: Protest Dynamics 
in Late Mubarak Egypt,” Perspectives on Politics 13/4 (2015): 958–75.
78 “Statement of the April 6 Movement Regarding the Demands of the Youth and the Refusal 
to Negotiate with any Side,” Jadaliyya, February 6, 2011. (http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/
index/579/statement-of-the-april-6-movement-regarding-the-demands-of-the-youth 
-and-the-refusal-to-negotiate-with-any-side).
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interest polarization with regards to the future distribution of power left little 
room for compromise. In response to the demonstrations of the April 6 Move-
ment, the government sent out the Central Security Forces, who used tear gas, 
water cannons, and physical violence in an attempt to disperse the protesters. 
However, in comparison to the past, repression backfired and drew wider seg-
ments of society to the streets. As an official explains, this took the government 
by surprise:
A revolution is never something that is expected, if not there would be no 
revolution. Then it would be like evolution. […] Even in the first days of 
the revolution we did not see it as a revolution, but as a demonstration, 
like any other demonstration. […] So it just escalated and it happened.79
Only when Mubarak saw himself confronted with rising pressure on the streets 
and a military leadership that put its own interests over loyalty to him, did he 
address “the youth of Egypt” to announce that he would meet their “legitimate 
demands.”80 However, the protesting groups refused to negotiate with the gov-
ernment, leading to Mubarak’s forced resignation on February 11, 2011.
In sum, differences with regards to institutionalization, certification, and 
interest polarization have resulted in divergent government responses to po-
litical youth protest in Morocco and Egypt. This holds despite the fact that in 
both countries the protesters demanded a change of regime, i.e., a parliamen-
tary monarchy and a representative democracy, respectively. Yet, the politi-
cal context in Morocco paved the way for a more moderate youth movement 
that directed its demands at the government, to which the latter responded 
through a mix of partial concessions, selective inclusion and targeted repres-
sion. In Egypt, the political context had brought about a youth movement that 
protested against the government. Here, political concessions or even inclu-
sion under the current government were inconceivable on both sides.
 Outlook: Responding to Political Protest in Times of Transition
The aim of this study was to explain variations in initial government respons-
es to the 2011 protests. Therefore, the above analysis focused on the strate-
gies deployed in Egypt’s dominant-party regime before Mubarak was ousted. 
79 Interview by the author at the Ministry of Finance, Department for Economic Justice, 
Cairo, December 2013.
80 Hosni Mubarak, “Speech to the Nation,” Cairo, February 10, 2011.
 113Managing Contention
middle east law and governance 10 (2017) 91-116
<UN>
However, it is worth examining how government strategies evolved in the en-
suing transition period, which offered a period of “de-institutionalization,”81 
opening windows of opportunity for new political practices and strategies. In-
deed, the election of the Islamist President Mohamed Morsi of the Freedom 
and Justice Party (fjp) led to a shift in government responses to youth pro-
tests. Following its inauguration, the Islamist government organized dialogue 
sessions with different groups of youth activists to discuss their positions and 
demands. Moreover, it started a political awareness program on the new con-
stitution, implemented by the scc. Due to an increase in international aid, 
the government was also able to extend job-creation programs.82 Following a 
conference on youth inclusion in December 2012, the Social Fund for Devel-
opment (sfd) initiated specific programs in the areas of youth employment 
and financial inclusion. Conversely, levels of repression decreased in the first 
months of Morsi’s reign. However, mounting political polarization between 
the then ruling Islamists and the liberal opposition stalled dialogue between 
secular-leaning youth activists and the government. The youth movement be-
came increasingly fragmented and marginalized, as the political game came to 
be dominated by the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood and powerful 
state actors, such as the military, judiciary, and parts of the bureaucracy.83 The 
mounting tensions between the president’s supporters and opponents fueled 
violent clashes across Egypt, with state security forces using excessive violence 
reminiscent of the Mubarak era. In 2013, state security began to support mobi-
lization against Morsi by the newly formed Tamarod (Rebellion) Movement.84 
Following large demonstrations on the anniversary of Morsi’s presidential in-
auguration on June 30, the military launched a coup on July 3, which paved the 
way for the presidency of former army general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
Following the establishment of the military regime, dialogue sessions 
were quickly abandoned and youth activists contesting the military govern-
ment faced increasing repression by the state security forces.85 Moreover, the 
81 Frédéric Volpi “Explaining (and re-explaining) political change in the Middle East during 
the Arab Spring: trajectories of democratization and of authoritarianism in the Maghreb,” 
Democratization 20/6 (2013): 970.
82 Interview by the author at the scc, Cairo, December 2013.
83 Marina Ottaway, “Democratic Transitions and the Problem of Power,” Middle East Pro-
gram Occasional Paper Series (Spring 2014).
84 On the role of the state security forces in the Tamarod campaign, see Marina Ottaway, 
“Democratic Transitions and the Problem of Power,” 3.
85 Nadine Abdalla, “Youth movements in the Egyptian Transformation”; Amnesty Interna-
tional, “Generation Jail. Egypt’s Youth go from Protest to Prison,” mde 12/1853/2015 (June 
2015).
Thyen
middle east law and governance 10 (2017) 91-116
<UN>
114
military government has returned to the strategy of dividing socio-economic 
and  political issues by conferring legitimacy only to the former. Shortly after 
the coup, it announced a 71 percent increase in the minimum salary of state 
employees, and promised to follow up on this with legislation for the pri-
vate sector. By contrast, no political concessions or inclusionary offers have 
been made. Political activists have been arrested, imprisoned, forcefully dis-
appeared, and tortured. In the year following the ouster of Morsi, more than 
1,400 demonstrators were killed and there have been mounting reports of ill 
treatment and torture of detainees.86 The repression targeted supporters of 
the defunct president, but also secular-leaning youth groups. In an interview 
conducted in November 2013, a government official explains the hard stance 
towards political protest:
There are two types [of protesters]. There are those who have a legitimate 
reason to demonstrate, either demanding rights that they are denied or 
[because] they disagree with a decision taken by government; and this is 
all acceptable. […] Then, there are those who don’t like you … They don’t 
like the way society is organized, and they want something else. They 
want another society. That’s a tough one. That’s a different one. They are 
not playing by the rules of the game. They are playing by different rules 
that suit them. That is a disagreement on cohabitation, and that’s differ-
ent. Obviously, we all must live together, and we all have to have common 
rules […]. [T]o say I don’t want to play by these rules and I want other 
rules and you’re a minority, then you don’t have the right.87
In 2014, the April 6 Movement was officially banned.
 Conclusion
Comparing government responses to youth protest in Morocco and Egypt be-
fore and during the 2011 uprisings showed that the initial reactions were not 
simply the result of strategic miscalculations by Mubarak or the “smartness” of 
86 Amnesty International, “Egypt: New Leader Faces Rights Crisis, Should Not Ignore Worst 
Situation in Decades,” Press Release, June 9, 2014 (https://www.amnesty.org/en/press 
-releases/2014/06/egypt-new-leader-faces-rights-crisis-should-not-ignore-worst-situa-
tion-deca/).
87 Interview by Nadine Sika at the Ministry of Finance, Cairo, November 2013.
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King Mohammed vi.88 They followed preexisting patterns of political conten-
tion, shaped by divergent degrees of protest institutionalization, external cer-
tification, and interest polarization. In light of relatively persistent institutions 
and conventions in dealing with protest, it was inconceivable that the Moroc-
can government would open fire on the youth activists, or that the Egyptian 
government would offer benefits to its challengers.
These results advance our knowledge on government responses to political 
protest, and particularly the 2011 uprisings, in several aspects. First, the present 
findings contribute to the literature on monarchies, by showing why they tend 
to respond beneficially: because monarchies tend to balance political power, 
they can institutionalize certain forms of political protest, which opens room 
for external certification and lowers polarization. While this “taming” of con-
tentious politics lowers levels of repression, it mirrors the dilemma postured 
by McCarthy and McPhail who state that protest potentially loses its force 
through institutionalization.89 Paradoxically, it thus appears that monarchies 
are more resilient to political protest precisely because they leave greater room 
for regime contention. Note that this finding does however not apply to mo-
narchical regimes per se. Research comparing monarchies in the region has 
shown that they reacted quite differently to the challenges of the 2011 uprisings 
based on preexisting regime variations.90
Second, and relatedly, these results demonstrate why governments in 
dominant-party regimes tend to be more dependent on repression once pro-
tests erupt. Because alternative political organization directly undermines the 
government’s legitimacy, dominant-party regimes cannot offer concessions 
or inclusion to challengers in the same way as regimes in which the ruler is 
not beholden to elections. If the ruling party loses influence, the government 
is threatened as well. In such a high-stake conflict, giving into protesters’ de-
mands is virtually suicidal. Research indicates that this dilemma increases in 
military regimes, where alternative means of legitimation are even less preva-
lent than in dominant-party regimes.91 Recent developments in Egypt appear 
to confirm this observation, as repression under the al-Sisi government has 
88 Saloua Zerhouni, “‘Smartness’ Without Vision. The Moroccan Regime in the Face of Ac-
quiescent Elites and Weak Social Mobilization,” swp Comments 11 (February 2014).
89 John D. McCarthy and Clark McPhail, “The Institutionalization of Protest.”
90 André Bank, Thomas Richter, and Anna Sunik, “Durable, Yet Different.”
91 Christian Davenport, “State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace,” Journal of Peace Re-
search 44/4 (2007): 485–504.
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sky-rocked. Increased repression, however, is likely to lead to militant and po-
tentially violent backlash in the future.92
In light of the Arab uprisings, concessions and inclusion may appear “safer” 
than violent suppression of political protest. However, one should be careful 
when drawing any conclusion regarding the long-term effects of beneficent 
strategies. It is well known that concessions can encourage oppositional forces 
to press for further change.93 Moreover, moderation of political demands does 
not necessarily mean that opposition forces also moderate their true prefer-
ences.94 Emboldened regime opponents can raise the bar for compromise as 
their political leverage increases, which can become problematic when the 
government is no longer willing to liberalize. Recent political developments 
in Morocco indicate that the political reform process has stalled, “potentially 
undermining the very bases of the kingdom’s domestic stability.”95
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